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In 1960, two years after Alaska became a state, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower created the Arctic National Wildlife Range in northeastern
Alaska to protect the unique wildlife, wilderness and recreational value
of the area.1 Twenty years later, the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) elevated the status of the Range to
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and expanded its size from 8.9
million acres to approximately 19 million acres. 2 The purposes of
ANWR are fourfold: to conserve the populations and habitats of the
diverse range of species utilizing the plain; to ensure that the United
States fulfills its obligations under various fish and wildlife protection
treaties; to provide for the continuing subsistence uses of the refuge;
and to protect the supply and quality of water in the refuge. 3
When ANILCA was enacted, little was known about this remote
area.4 A 1979 Senate Report stated that:
[t]he Committee was particularly concerned with the ANWR.
In hearings and in markup, conflicting and uncertain informa-
tion was presented to the committee about the extent of oil and
gas resources on the Range and the effect development and
production of those resources would have on the wildlife in-
habiting the Range and the Range itself .... The Committee
was determined that a decision as to the development of the
Range be made only with adequate information and the full
participation of the Congress. 5
To ensure access to information needed to decide whether to allow de-
velopment of the ANWR, Congress ordered the Secretary of the Interior
to prepare a "comprehensive and continuing inventory and assessment"
of the ANWR coastal plain's fish and wildlife resources and to perform
an analysis of the impacts on these resources of oil and gas exploration,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; J.D., Harvard Law
School; M.B.A., Harvard Business School; A.B., Harvard College; with special thanks to
Kim Reeves and Elizabeth Bourbon.
1. Public Land Order No. 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (1960); Alaska Statehood Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
2. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, §§ 302-
303, 94 Stat. 2371, 2385-93 (1980). In addition to establishing ANWR, ANILCA also cre-
ated or expanded fifteen other wildlife refuges in Alaska.
3. Id. § 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980). See generally CRS REPORT FOR CON-
GRESS, THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: MAJOR OIL DEVELOPMENT OR WILDERNESS
34 (Feb. 25, 1988) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
4. S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 241 (1979).
5. Id.
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development and production. Additionally, the Secretary was to ensure
that exploratory activities within the coastal plain would be conducted
so as to avoid significant adverse effects on the fish and wildlife and
other ANWR resources. 6 The future of ANWR's development thus de-
pends heavily on the resolution of factual questions about the environ-
mental, subsistence and mineral resource characteristics of the coastal
plain.
ANILCA provides the legal structure that will determine whether
ANWR will be protected from the damaging encroachment of oil and
gas development and whether ANWR will remain an unblemished re-
serve for native peoples who presently coexist with large numbers of
resident and migratory species. To analyze the desirability of develop-
ment, a three-part process is utilized. First, findings of fact concerning
the impact of such development in ANWR upon the environment and
the indigenous cultures are to be derived from a report compiled by the
Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 1002 of ANILCA (1002 Re-
port). This 1002 Report is to consist of a baseline biological study of
ANWR, an Environmental Impact Statement regarding non-drilling ex-
ploration and a recommendation by the Secretary of the Interior. Next,
Congress must determine the viability of oil and gas development based
upon the findings of fact in the 1002 Report. Finally, after consideration
of all of the above, Congress may grant the Secretary of the Interior
leasing authority to begin exploration and development.
ANILCA, however, adds the additional requirement that any use of
the reserve must be compatible with the purposes for which the area was
established. This additional safeguard creates another obstacle in the
path of oil exploration before drilling activities can begin. Title VIII of
ANILCA also contains an independent barrier to oil and gas develop-
ment. Section 810 of the Act requires that proposals for the use of Alas-
kan public lands must minimize any adverse impact upon the
subsistence use of that land. Under section 810, the Secretary of the
Interior is responsible for evaluating the impact of development on sub-
sistence use and protecting such use from adverse effects.
The task of developing the required factual record rests upon the
Secretary of the Interior, and because that record will be the primary
source of information upon which Congress will rely to decide whether
to allow development, the Secretary wields significant power. The shap-
ing of the factual record will perhaps be the most important aspect of
the legal process that will determine the future character of ANWR.
Controversies over the results of the various required studies will be
subject only to limited and deferential scrutiny in the courts. 7 The role
of the Secretary in the legal process, therefore, is paramount. At pres-
ent, Congress awaits the Secretary's report.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (1988); see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
7. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 881-83 (D.D.C. 1991). The 1002 Report is
prepared as a management tool for Congress for its own purposes and is not subject to
judicial review. Id. at 882.
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Oil and gas development proponents and opponents alike are mo-
bilizing. The context of the ANWR controversy can only be fully appre-
ciated by recognizing the stark contrast between the goals of the two
groups colliding in the development debate. The parties involved in the
process vary from indigenous peoples and environmentalists to oil com-
panies and state and federal governments. This spectrum of adversa-
ries, however, is overshadowed by the overwhelming dimension of the
subject of the debate: the 9 million acres of ecologically sensitive terri-
tory which rest atop perhaps 30 billion barrels of oil and 65 trillion cubic
feet of gas.8
The struggle to determine ANWR's fate is a battle of extremes. In
no other environmental debate are the stakes so high for so many differ-
ent constituents. From the perspective of governmental entities and oil
companies, the refuge represents millions of dollars in revenues and the
chance to revitalize the domestic oil industry. For state and local gov-
ernments and some native groups, leasing ANWR for development will
replace the jobs and income from Prudhoe Bay and North Slope devel-
opment upon which these groups have come to rely. Development may
also be the only means to preserve the Transnational Alaska Pipeline
that has brought jobs and tax revenues which pay for essential services.
To the Department of the Interior, development will mean both an im-
portant revenue boost and a political victory. For environmentalists,
this is the ultimate battle to preserve a vast virgin wilderness. Finally,
for the Gwich'in Athabascan, 9 the resolution of the controversy may well
mark the end of an entire culture.
This article explores the empirical, legal and political processes that
will determine the fate of ANWR. Part II of this article provides back-
ground information about ANWR in general: the ecology of the re-
serve, its inhabitants and the possibility of oil and gas reserves. Part III
undertakes an analysis of the components in the factual record-the
1002 Report, the Environmental Impact Statement, the Compatible Use
requirement and the section 810 analysis-and the role of the Secretary
of the Interior in the production of that record. Congress must use this
factual record to determine whether leasing of ANWR falls within the
guidelines established by ANILCA. Finally, Part IV concludes that the
statutory scheme designed to protect ANWR is faulty because it is essen-
tially under the full control of the Secretary of the Interior who will not
likely recommend that Congress simply redesignate ANWR as statutory
wilderness to protect it from development.
8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, ALASKA,
COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 75
(1987) [hereinafter IMPACT STATEMENT].
9. The Gwich'in Athabascan are a native Indian tribe, who pursue the traditional
subsistence lifestyle of their ancestors and are dependent on hunting and fishing for food.
They live in settlements along the Alaska-Canada border, including a settlement within the
ANWR. Susan Reed, Shadow Over an Ancient Land, PEOPLE, Sept. 18, 1989, at 50.
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II. BACKGROUND
The coastal plain, the most controversial territory in the refuge, lies
in the northern part of the refuge, 250 miles above the Arctic Circle.
This plain encompasses 1.55 million acres over an area measuring ap-
proximately 100 miles long and sixteen to thirty-four miles wide. Pris-
tine, fragile tundra characterizes the coastal plain.' 0 Almost all of the
area is wetlands" with only a few freestanding lakes. No streams or
rivers traverse the plain.
Throughout most of the year, the coastal plain landscape is cold
and desolate. Ten percent of the area is glaciated and lies under a thick
layer of permafrost. 12 Winter temperatures average only four degrees
below zero. 13 From mid-May to July every year, however, the coastal
plain becomes what has been described as the "American Serengeti.''
14
Mild summer temperatures and a bountiful food supply bring a uniquely
diverse range of wildlife to the plain. Species attracted to the coastal
plain include polar bears, grizzly bears, musk oxen, Dall sheep, wolves,
wolverines, snow geese, peregrine falcons and numerous other bird spe-
cies, some of which migrate from as far as Africa, Australia and
Antarctica. 15
One of the species which relies on the coastal plain's summer
habitat is the Porcupine caribou herd. The herd is presently 180,000
strong, making it the sixth largest herd in North America. 16 The coastal
plain provides critical summer habitat for the caribou during and after
calving, supplying a quiet source of food and relief from insects and
predators at this critical period in the herd's annual cycle. 17 The Porcu-
pine herd has consistently returned to the coastal plain to calve every
year, and their migration has been documented since 1972, when stud-
ies of the herd commenced. 18
The ANWR controversy has focused a significant amount of atten-
tion on the Porcupine caribou herd for several reasons. Such herds are
the subject of special statutory recognition in their own right; Congress
has found that "the barren-ground caribou are a migratory species de-
serving study and special protections, and the Western Arctic and the
10. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 13. Ninety-nine percent of the section 1002
lands, or 1.5 million acres, are classified as wetlands. Free water is limited; only a few large
lakes exist. Id.
11. Id.
12. The permafrost is 800-1000 feet thick under most of the coastal plain. IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 11.
13. Patrick Lee, Alaska Oil Refuels an Old Debate, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1991, at Al.
14. G. Schaller, American Serengeti, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 54.
15. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 301(a)(3),
94 Stat. 2371 (1980); Lee, supra note 13, at A12.
16. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 21.
17. Id. at 25; Lee, supra note 13, at A12. Caribou cows in particular require rest and
relief during the postcalving season when the combined stresses of winter, pregnancy,
migration, birth, lactation, hair molt, antler growth and insect harassment tax the animals'
energy reserves. Id.
18. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 25. Migrating caribou and the postcalving
caribou aggregation offer an extraordinary spectacle. Id. at 46.
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Porcupine herds are of national and international significance."1 9 This
heightened level of statutory protection and the effects of development-
related disturbances, on caribou migration have prompted a great deal of
debate.
The caribou are also significant because they comprise the founda-
tion of the subsistence economy of the Gwich'in Athabascan, one of the
few remaining native groups in North America still engaged in a sub-
sistence economy. Subsistence has also received special statutory pro-
tection,20 and because the. Gwich'in's subsistence economy depends
directly on the well-being of the Porcupine herd, the caribou's fate
under any mineral development scheme has dual significance.
The Gwich'in Athabascan tribe occupies an area approximately 125
miles south of the coastal plain, concentrated in small settlements at
Arctic Village and Old Crow.2 1 Due to the remoteness of the area, the
Gwich'in rely on a subsistence economy for up to 80% of their food
supply.2 2 Subsistence is defined in ANILCA as:
customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of
wild, renewable resources for direct personal or family con-
sumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools or transporta-
tion; for the making and selling of handicraft articles out of
inedible byproducts of fish and wildlife resources taken for per-
sonal or family consumption; for barter, or sharing for personal
or family consumption; and for customary trade.
2 3
The cornerstone of the Gwich'in's subsistence economy is the Porcupine
caribou herd,24 and their annual harvest ranges from 200 to as many as
1000 caribou. 25 During certain seasons, three and sometimes four
meals a day consist of caribou. 26 The meat is shared with families
throughout the community, given as gifts or bartered for salmon.
27
Caribou skins are used to make clothing, winter mukluks, slippers and
purses, and the bones are used for tools.
28
The significance of the caribou to the Gwich'in's subsistence is not
merely economic-the caribou form the basis of a complex cultural
19. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 306(a),
94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
20. See infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
21. The Gwich'in town of Arctic Village is located within ANWR and has a population
of 120. Reed, supra note 9, at 50.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II at 76 (1978).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 3113 (1988).
24. The caribou are particularly important in towns such as Arctic Village which have
no salmon and only a few moose, sheep, birds and fish. Robert A. Childers, The Gwich'in:
A Nation in Peril, 6 ENrrL. FORUM 14, 16 (1989).
25. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 25, 40. The Inupiat Eskimos from the village
of Kaktovik also harvest between 25 to 75 caribou each year, but they rely primarily on seal
and bowhead whales for their food supply. E. Linden, A Tale of Two Villages, TME, Apr. 17,
1989, at 62.
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structure. 29 The Gwich'in's subsistence culture is rooted in 10,000
years of tradition. 30 In the tightly organized societal structure of subsis-
tence every member of the community plays a vital role in the mutual
survival of the group. The Gwich'in fear that if their chief survival re-
source disappears, the entire social structure will erode. Many members
of the tiny communities will be forced to leave to seek jobs in the cities
or the oil fields, and those that remain will be forced to go on welfare.
3 1
Even though development may offer jobs, many Gwich'in feel the bene-
fits of a cash economy are dubious; as one chief observed, "Here you
don't see drugs and alcohol, or suicide and murder. Here people walk
around proud that we have our land."
'32
If development takes place, the Gwich'in stand to lose everything.
Unlike the Kaktovic Inupiat Eskimo group, the Gwich'in refused to par-
ticipate in a 1971 land settlement that would have given them an interest
in subsurface development. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of
1971 (ANCSA) 3 3 extinguished native aboriginal rights to land in Alaska
in exchange for a cash settlement of $963 million and fee title to 44
million acres of land.3 4 The settlement created village and regional cor-
porations, giving each native in the various regions 100 shares of stock
in the appropriate regional corporation and providing that these shares
were inalienable until 1991.35 Subsurface rights to land included in the
settlement were vested in the Regional Corporations, while the Village
Corporations controlled the surface estate.3 6 If the Gwich'in had
elected to accept this settlement, they might at least have enjoyed reve-
nues from leasing. As it is, the Gwich'in retain aboriginal rights to 1.8
million acres in and near ANWR, and if development proceeds, the
Gwich'in stand to lose the basis of their economy and cultural life.
The issue of development has divided the native communities.
3 7
Some groups stand to benefit directly from development. For instance,
the Kaktovic Inupiat Corporation holds subsurface rights to 92,000
acres in the coastal plain, and the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation
holds subsurface rights outside the plain.3 8 In addition to royalties,
some natives will benefit from the creation ofjobs-an increasingly im-
29. ANILCA states that subsistence is "essential" to the natives' "cultural existence."
16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (1988).
30. Reed, supra note 9, at 49.
31. Id. at 48; Linden, supra note 25, at 62.
32. Linden, supra note 25, at 62.
33. Pub. L. No. 92-203,85 Star. 688 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1988
& Supp. 1992)).
34. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1605 (1988). ANCSA was enacted in response to a dispute
between the newly recognized State of Alaska, which had begun to select tracts of land for
state ownership, and natives who claimed aboriginal title to much of the land selected by
the state. ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 114 (1976).
35. This restriction was amended in 1987 to provide that shareholders in the corpora-
tions may decide when to eliminate the restrictions on alienation. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c
(Supp. 11 1990).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(0 (1988).
37. Patrick Lee, Some Native Peoples See Dividends, Others See Disaster in Oil Drilling, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at A12.
38. Id.
[Vol. 70:1
AMERICA'S LAST GREAT WILDERNESS
portant concern as the Prudhoe Bay field dissipates. Some members of
these communities, however, sympathize with the Gwich'in's claim of
the right to continue a subsistence existence. The Inupiat, similarly, de-
pend heavily on harvesting whales and seals and are concerned about
what development in the coastal plain may portend for offshore
drilling.
3 9
The paradox presented by this visually barren plain is that, in addi-
tion to its tremendous biological and subsistence values, the coastal
plain may have significant petroleum resource potential as well. Situ-
ated between the Prudhoe Bay oil field to the west and Canadian
Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta region to the east, ANWR may be part of
the North Slope oil province; it is touted as the most promising onshore
exploration target in the United States.
40
The probability of locating oil reserves and the extent of those
reserves in ANWR are major topics of debate. According to the 1987
1002 Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Interior, there is a 19%o
chance of finding economically recoverable oil within the coastal plain.
4 1
This 1002 Report suggests a mean estimate of 3.2 billion barrels of re-
coverable oil, with economically recoverable reserves ranging from 0.6
billion barrels to 9.2 billion barrels-about the same amount as in
Prudhoe Bay.4 2 The report predicts a 95% chance that the coastal plain
contains more than 4.8 billion barrels of oil and 11.5 trillion cubic feet
of gas and a 5%o chance that the area contains 29.4 billion barrels of oil
and 64.5 trillion cubic feet of gas.4 3 These 1987 estimates reflect a high
probability of finding economically recoverable oil given the relatively
small exploration area (1.55 million acres) and the high costs of con-
ducting operations in the Arctic.
An April, 1991, document by the Bureau of Land Management re-
vised and increased the 1987 figures.4 4 The report claims there is a
39. Id.
40. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 177.
41. Id. at 177. For reasons discussed in more depth, see infra discussion at pp. 608-09,
the conclusions drawn by the Secretary are currently being challenged under the National
Environmental Policy Act as not supported by the record and as being arbitrary and capri-
cious. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 111, NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1991) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memorandum]. The author of this paper is not technically qualified to comment
on the reliability of these figures but offers them to suggest the dimensions of the debate.
42. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 178. This figure has been challenged by
NRDC on the grounds that the economic recoverability figure is based on 1984 prices that
are far higher than those prevailing since the mid-1980s. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra
note 41, at 90.
43. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 75.
44. Bureau of Land Management, Dep't of the Interior, Overview of the 1991 Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge Recoverable Petroleum Resource Update (Apr. 8, 1991) [herein-
after BLM 1991 Overview]. The figures contained in this document have been criticized
on the grounds that the sources and bases of this information have not been revealed, and
thus the document is little more than a conclusory prediction. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 884.
After the figures in this document were cited to Congress in a number of hearings, a court
ordered the Department of the Interior to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Study in conjunction with this newly released information, and thus this information may
be subject to change. Id. at 891.
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46% marginal probability of finding economically recoverable oil and
increases the mean resource estimate from 3.23 to 3.57 billion barrels of
oil,4 5 as contrasted with the 1002 Report estimate of a 5%o chance of
recovering at least 8.8 billion barrels of oil.4 6 Furthermore, the report
raises the number of prospective drilling sites from ten to thirty.
4 7 If
these figures are accurate, ANWR would become the second largest oil
field ever developed in the United States.
The validity of both the 1991 and the 1987 figures, however, has
been called into question. 48 The 1991 estimate in particular has been
challenged. 4 9 The Department of the Interior has only recently been
ordered to circulate the report for public comment and has not revealed
the source of information upon which it relied in formulating the esti-
mates. 50 Due to statutory restrictions on drilling activities,5 1 only one
test well has been drilled, and the results of this drilling have remained
highly confidential.
52
Environmental activists, in contrast, have vowed to "draw a line in
the tundra" to prevent development in the coastal plain.53 Although
the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and the Wilderness So-
ciety have taken an especially visible role in the debate, the battle to
defeat development has attracted the support of a vast number of envi-
ronmental organizations. Citing the overall pattern of environmental
damage in Alaskan oil fields 54 as well as notable disasters like the Exxon
Valdez oil spill at Prince William Sound, environmentalists scoff at the
notion that oil development can be conducted without destroying the
coastal plain habitat. The environmental community views the contro-
versy as a struggle to save the last great wilderness. The prevailing view
is that if ANWR is not immune from development, nothing is sacred.
To environmentalists, the battle also represents an opportunity for the
nation to make a fundamental policy choice in favor of the environment
by making a commitment to renewable sources of energy instead of ex-
ploiting mineral resources at the expense of the environment.
In addition to questioning the estimates of recoverable oil, environ-
mentalists have suggested that, even if the estimates of recoverable oil
prove correct, this amount is only enough to supply the country's needs
for 200 days and will not reduce the nation's dependence on oil im-
ports.5 5 Nevertheless, these criticisms have done little to dampen the
45. BLM 1991 Overview, supra note 44, at 1.
46. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 886, citing IMPACT STATEMENT.
47. ANWR Plays Key Role in Interior Budget; Outer Continental Shelf Sales Uncertain, 21
ENV'T REP. 1797 (Feb. 8, 1991) [hereinafter ANWR Plays Key Role].
48. See generally Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 884-91.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 891-92.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(d) (1988).
52. Chevron drilled a test well in 1985 on ANWR land adjacent to the coast, which is
controlled by the Kaktovic Inupiat Corporation. Lee, supra note 13, at A1O.
53. Paul Rauber, Last Refuge, SIERRA, Jan.-Feb. 1992 at 38 (quoting from statement of
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.)).
54. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 116-24; Lee, supra note 13, at A1O-1 1.
55. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 89-94; Lee, supra note 13, at A10.
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enthusiasm of the proponents of oil development. ANWR will continue
to be portrayed as the last great oil field as well as the last great wilder-
ness. To date, neither side can claim absolute victory. It might be said
that the environmentalists are prevailing at the moment because, so far,
the ANWR has not been opened for drilling activities. On the other
hand, the oil companies and governmental entities are anxiously await-
ing any opportunity to change the status quo.
Pressure for oil and gas discovery must be understood in the con-
text of declining reserves in Prudhoe Bay and the limited lifespan of the
Transnational Alaska Pipeline. Prudhoe Bay's reserves have declined
significantly over the past decade,5 6 and the continued viability of the
Transnational Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS) is at stake. The pipeline
was originally designed to last until the year 2007, but corrosion has
eaten away at the pipeline more rapidly than predicted.5 7 As a conse-
quence, the pipeline is becoming increasingly expensive to maintain.
Due to the rising costs and declining reserves in Prudhoe Bay, operation
of the TAPS will become cost-prohibitive by 2009 unless other reserves
become available. 58 The Secretary of the Interior urges that the need to
transport ANWR oil alone can keep the pipeline open for decades-long
enough to produce a billion barrels of North Slope oil that otherwise
would not be economically feasible to produce.59
The State of Alaska and the federal government stand to gain a
great deal from opening ANWR for development. First, the economic
stimulation produced by ANWR development represents political cur-
rency. The Secretary of the Interior claims that ANWR production can
generate over $150 billion in taxes and other revenues. 60 These tax rev-
enues would enable Alaska to provide better health and educational
services in areas that typically have very few public facilities. Addition-
ally, the Secretary postulates that ANWR revenues would reduce the
trade deficit by $200 billion and create 700,000 jobs nationwide.6 1 The
Secretary of the Interior also has a direct budgetary stake in the develop-
ment of ANWR and is already relying heavily on projected ANWR leas-
ing revenues. 6 2 Confident that ANWR leasing would be approved, the
Secretary assumed in his fiscal 1992 budget that the Department would
receive $1.9 billion in revenue from ANWR leasing.
63
Division of leasing revenues is at the heart of a bitter controversy
that may have contributed to Congress's refusal to approve leasing in
1991. Under the Alaska Statehood Act of 1959, Alaska claims 90%o of
any oil revenues from the refuge with the remaining 10% going to the
56. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 177-78.
57. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 16 n.19.
58. Federal Estimates of ANWR Potential Pessimistic, Geologist Tells Subcommittee, 22 ENV'T
REP. 660 (July 19, 1991).
59. Manuel Lujan, A Mandate to Balance Protection with the Use of Our Riches, ROLL CALL,
Nov. 18, 1991, at Policy Briefing No. 33, 1991 Natural Resources.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ANIVR Plays Key Role, supra note 47, at 1797.
63. Id.
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Department of the Interior.6 However, the Secretary of the Interior
has tried various ways of evading the state's 90% share. In July of 1987,
the Secretary conducted secret negotiations with several native corpora-
tions in other refuges for the purpose of diverting the 90% royalties to
the native corporations. 6 5 Ordered by the Reagan Administration to
drop this plan, the Secretary next tried a more direct approach. In the
unveiling of Bush's 1991 energy plan, the Secretary proposed that the
Administration should keep 100% of the revenues, contending that
ANWR is a federal refuge. 66 More recently, a 50-50 split has been pro-
posed, but the issue remains unresolved.6 7 Until the revenue share is-
sue is settled, proponents of development are less likely to mount an
effective coalition to open the refuge.
Nevertheless, both proponents and opponents of ANWR oil and
gas development will continue to mount significant pressure upon the
State of Alaska, the Department of the Interior and Congress. These
campaigns are, to a large extent, determined by the designated process
through which Congress must determine whether ANWR should be
opened for development.
III. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE AND ANWR DEVELOPMENT
The legal structure established to protect ANWR's environmental
and subsistence resources is, perhaps, critically flawed. Within the
structure, the Secretary of the Interior maintains tremendous power to
shape the course of events by molding a fact record that supports devel-
opment. First, the Secretary can exert significant influence on Con-
gress's decision to grant leasing authority. The factual record could
serve as a vehicle to convince Congress that oil and gas development
will not significantly impair the environmental and subsistence values
the refuge was designed to protect and that the coastal plain's potential
mineral resources justify any disturbance to these values.
68
If Congress ultimately approves leasing, however, other statutory
requirements may bar development 6 9 -but again, the strength of these
barriers will be determined by the Secretary's success in shaping the fac-
tual record. The question whether development is compatible with the
refuge's environmental and subsistence purposes probably will be deter-
mined largely by the factual findings in the 1002 Report, the leasing
Environmental Impact Statement and the subsistence study. By taking
full advantage of courts' limited level of scrutiny under the arbitrary and
64. Alaska Statehood Act, supra note 1; see generally Lisa J. Booth, Comment, Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge: A Crown Jewel in Jeopardy, 9 PUB. LAND L. REV. 105 (1988).
65. See Booth, supra note 64, at 121-23.
66. Alaska Governor Stunned by White House Plan, Will Fight for Share of ANWR Oil and Gas
Revenue, 21 ENV'T REP. 1986 (Mar. 8, 1991).
67. Id.
68. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 63-103. It should be noted, however,
that not all senators meekly accept the fact record put together by employees of the execu-
tive branch. See generally CRS REPORT, supra note 3, which is an example of the type of
factfinding commissioned by Congress.
69. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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capricious standard, 70 the Secretary has great leeway to mold a fact rec-
ord that will further his political agenda with Congress and insulate his
later decisions from judicial inquiry.
The legal structure which determines the course of events in ANWR
is provided in ANILCA. At present, development in ANWR is prohib-
ited unless Congress grants leasing authority to the Secretary of the In-
terior.7 1 ANILCA defers congressional debate on this issue pending the
preparation of several informational studies by the Secretary, including
the comprehensive 1002 Report regarding the coastal plain and its envi-
ronmental and resource values.7 2 Should Congress decide to extend
leasing authority, the Secretary will be required to complete an Environ-
mental Impact Study on the impacts of leasing.73 In addition, section
810 of ANILCA requires the Secretary to evaluate the impact of oil and
gas operations on the coastal plain, on subsistence and to minimize any
adverse impacts. 74 Finally, under both ANILCA and the National Wild-
life Refuge Act, the Secretary may not permit uses of the refuge that are
inconsistent with the refuge's major purposes.
75
A. Section 1002 Report
Section 1002 of ANILCA requires the Secretary to compile several
informational analyses of ANWR's coastal plain. The first two, a base-
line biological study and an Environmental Impact Statement related to
non-drilling exploration guidelines for the range, have been completed
without challenge.
7 6
The third informational assessment of the coastal plain, in contrast,
has proved extremely controversial. Section 1002(h) solicits the Secre-
tary's recommendations concerning development activity in the coastal
70. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 881-83 (D.D.C. 1991). The 1002 Report is not
subject to judicial review because existing guidelines are vague and insufficient for judicial
use in evaluating compliance with the statute. Id. at 883.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (1988).
72. Id. § 3142(h). See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 3149 (1988). An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a detailed
written statement prepared by the responsible official, in this case the Secretary of the
Interior, for "every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). In Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (9th
Cir. 1986), the Secretary of the Interior was required to prepare a separate Legislative EIS
(LEIS) in conjunction with the Section 1002 Report.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1988). It is not completely clear from the statute when this
report is to be prepared, and several groups have mounted a strong argument that this
subsistence study should be completed before Congress makes any decision concerning
leasing. See discussion pp. 64-66. However, the U.S. District Court for the D.C. Circuit has
held that this subsistence study is not required until congressional approval has been ob-
tained. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 884.
75. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§ 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980); National Wildlife Refuge System Administration
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668ee (1988).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988) (baseline study); 16 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (exploration
guidelines) (1985). For the baseline study, the Secretary is directed to:
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plain. 77 The 1002 Report serves to identify potential oil and gas pro-
duction areas and estimate the potential volume at stake; describe the
fish and wildlife in the coastal plain and their habitat, evaluating the ad-
verse effects of further exploration activities; describe how any oil and
gas produced in the coastal plain could be transported to processing
facilities; and evaluate the national need for new domestic sources of oil
and gas.78 The 1002 Report should conclude with the Secretary's rec-
ommendations concerning whether further exploration and develop-
ment should be permitted, as well as an identification of additional legal
authority needed to avoid or minimize harm to wildlife and habitat from
these activities. 79 Notwithstanding Congress's recent refusal to confer
leasing authority, this Report can be expected to play an important role
in future congressional debate.
8 0
1. The Environmental Impact Study
The 1002 Report has been a target of litigation from the outset.
Shortly after the Fish and Wildlife Service completed an initial version
of the report in 1983, a coalition of environmental groups challenged its
failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).8 1 In response to this law-
suit, the Secretary decided to prepare such a statement; however, he in-
tended to submit the document directly to Congress without prior
circulation of a draft for public comment, in accordance with the abbre-
viated procedures available for a Legislative Environmental Impact
Study (LEIS).8 2 The Trustees for Alaska court held that the 1002 Report
was a legislative study process, and subject to the full range of proce-
dural requirements applicable to an Environmental Impact Statement,
including notice and comment procedures. 83 In accordance with the
(A) assess the size, range, and distribution of the populations of the fish and
wildlife;
(B) determine the extent, location and carrying capacity of habitats of the fish
and wildlife;
(C) assess the impacts of human activities and natural processes on the fish
and wildlife and their habitats;
(D) analyze the potential impacts of oil and gas exploration, development,
and production on such wildlife and habitats; and
(E) analyze the potential effects of such activities on the culture and lifestyle
(including subsistence) of affected Native and other people.
16 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988). The EIS for exploration activities was completed in 1983, and
the final report of the baseline study was published in 1986. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 873.
77. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(h) (1985).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Booth, supra note 64, at 121-23.
81. Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1986). The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a, requires the prepara-
tion of an EIS before any major federal action significantly affecting the environment. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
82. Trustees for Alaska, 806 F.2d at 1383 (construing 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1991)).
83. Id Ordinarily, an EIS must be circulated in draft form for public comment before
a final draft is completed. Exceptional procedures exist for an LEIS, which may be submit-
ted to Congress at the same time it is released to the public. However, the Trusteesfor
Alaska court held that the 1002 Report/LEIS represented a study process required by Con-
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court's ruling, the Secretary circulated a draft LEIS for public comment
and finally submitted the section 1002 Report and LEIS to Congress as a
single, integrated document in May of 1987. The substantive adequacy
of this final 1002 Report/LEIS is currently being challenged under
NEPA.
8 4
A new chapter in the saga of the 1002 Report was opened in April
of 1991, when the Bureau of Land Management produced a report re-
vising the likelihood of oil discovery in the coastal plain. This document
prompted the plaintiffs challenging the existing 1002 Report/LEIS to
claim that this information significantly revised the information relied
upon in the original LEIS, and should be released as a supplemental
LEIS (SEIS).8 5 After holding that the 1002 Report/LEIS is subject to
NEPA's supplementation requirements, the court found that the revised
estimates present significant new information that would affect the anal-
ysis of environmental impacts.86 Accordingly, the court ordered the
Secretary to release the 1991 Overview as an SEIS on an expedited ba-
sis.8 7 Another round of commenting and litigation is expected in con-
nection with this SEIS.
2. Substantive Adequacy
The substantive adequacy of the 1002 Report and LEIS has been
sharply criticized and is currently under attack.8 8 Underlying the nu-
merous specific complaints about the 1002 Report is the accusation that
the Secretary is cynically manipulating the Report to support his prede-
termined opinion that ANWR should be opened for leasing activity, thus
thwarting Congress's intention in section 1002(h) to seek an objective
source of data.8 9 Because the NRDC court has held that the report's
compliance with section 1002(h) is nonjusticiable due to a lack of man-
ageable standards for review,9 0 the remaining legal question concerns
the adequacy of the LEIS under NEPA.
Although the full range of allegations exceeds the scope of this pa-
per, a brief summary of criticisms is in order. One category of criticisms
concerns the factual adequacy of the Secretary's assessment. NEPA reg-
gress, which is an exception to the LEIS exception and is not eligible for abbreviated com-
menting procedures. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1, 1503.4 (1991); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.8,
1506.8(b)(2)(ii) (1991).
84. NRDC v. Lujan, Nos. 89-2345, 89-2393 (D.D.C. ordered July 22, 1991). A
number of other issues were resolved in the previous action, including issues of standing
and procedural compliance with NEPA. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 891 (D.D.C.
1991).
85. NEPA requires the preparation of an SEIS whenever there are significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the pro-
posed action or its impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1991).
86. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 888. The court pointed out that environmental impacts
were not addressed in the 1991 Overview and apparently were not considered at all. Id.
87. Id. at 891-92. The court declined to order the release of nonconfidential data
relied upon in preparing the 1991 Overview, noting that this claim was not ripe because a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal was pending. Id. at 890.
88. Booth, supra note 64, at 119-26; NRDC v. Lujan, Nos. 89-2345, 89-2393.
89. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 1, 4, 6.
90. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 883.
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ulations require that an EIS show how a proposed action will or will not
meet the requirements of applicable environmental laws and policies,
such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act and any other applicable
laws. 9 1 In this instance, environmentalists argue that the LEIS seriously
underestimates the severity of impacts within the coastal plain by giving
cursory treatment to issues such as hazardous waste disposal and waste-
water contamination. 9 2 Moreover, environmentalists argue that the Sec-
retary fails to discuss several types of impacts, such as air pollution.
9 3
Another serious shortcoming is the LEIS's failure to explore the cumu-
lative impacts of development. 9 4 For example, although the LEIS char-
acterizes oil spills as "an inevitable consequence" of development 95 and
acknowledges that these spills can seriously harm vegetation, it does not
explore the consequences of oil spills for species such as polar bears and
migratory fish. Instead, it flatly states that the cumulative effects of oil
spills are not significant.9 6
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the 1002 Report/LEIS is that
the Secretary's summary and recommendation contradicts the analysis
in the body of the document. The most egregious example is the con-
trast between the treatment of impacts to the Porcupine caribou herd in
the body of the document and the description of this analysis in the
recommendation. The body of the document acknowledges that the
Porcupine herd will experience "major effects" as a consequence of de-
velopment in the coastal plain. 97 This discussion stresses that the calv-
ing period spent in the coastal plain habitat is essential to the herd's
productivity and surmises that disruption of this traditional habitat can
be expected to diminish the herd's population.9" This portion of the
Report dismisses the notion that the development at Prudhoe Bay repre-
sents an analogous environmental success story, pointing out that the
population of this herd has lately begun to decline, and concedes that
this development has, in fact, interfered with the Central Arctic caribou
herd's movements. 99
The Secretary's recommendation and summary disregards this anal-
ysis. In his recommendation, the Secretary offers the disingenuous dis-
claimer that major effects are not necessarily adverse.' 0 0 This
91. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(d) (1991).
92. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 38.
93. Id. The EPA has also criticized the Secretary's failure to address air quality im-
pacts in the 1002 Report. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 54.
94. NEPA requires a comprehensive analysis of cumulative environmental impacts.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1991), construed in KIeppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
95. Numerous large (over 10,000 gallons) spills of crude oil, gasoline and diesel fuel
have occurred throughout the operation of Prudhoe Bay; in 1985 alone, over 82,000 gal-
lons were spilled. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 115, cited in Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 41, at 28.
96. Id.
97. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 123.
98. Id. at 24-25, 123-24.
99. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 118-24, cited in Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra
note 41, at 7.
100. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 187.
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recommendation deflects attention from the qualitative importance of
the time spent in the calving grounds by emphasizing its relatively brief
duration of six to eight weeks. 10 ' In the conclusion to the Report, the
Secretary claims that development and environmental values can coex-
ist, pointing obliquely to the "success at Prudhoe Bay and elsewhere"
without stating his basis for characterizing the Prudhoe Bay develop-
ments as successful.'
0 2
As NRDC alleges in its brief of the case, these statements may mis-
lead those readers who forego reading the entire 200-plus page docu-
ment in favor of skimming the summary and conclusions, and thus may
constitute a politically shrewd-if deceptive-strategy.' 0 3 However, it is
unclear whether this tactic will pass muster with a reviewing court, which
may go beyond the conclusory statements to examine the factual sup-
port in the body of the document. Although courts are reluctant to in-
quire closely into subjective agency decisionmaking under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review for agency action, reviewing courts
generally do require citation of some factual support for agency
decision. 1
04
Even if the plaintiffs prevail to some extent in the current lawsuit
and in possible future litigation concerning the SEIS, victory at this level
alone cannot prevent development in ANWR. The practical result of
challenges to the informational analyses prepared by the Secretary will
be to delay a congressional decision or, at most, to force the Secretary to
acknowledge more extensive environmental harm. An EIS, as well as an
LEIS or an SEIS, serves the purpose of putting knowledge of environ-
mental impacts before a decisionmaker and gives governmental entities
as much information as possible about environmental consequences, but
it has no force in and of itself to require the decisionmaker to change a
recommendation or decision.' 0 5 Moreover, since the adequacy of the
Secretary's recommendation under ANILCA section 1002(h) has been
ruled nonjusticiable, 10 6 the Secretary cannot be required to change his
recommendation of immediate full leasing on the basis of findings of
adverse environmental consequences.10 7 The litigation, however, may
pressure the Secretary to compromise, perhaps by adopting an alterna-
tive such as restricted leasing or further exploration, and may create
enough publicity to discredit the Secretary's objectivity in claiming that
oil and gas development will not destroy the coastal plain.
101. Il at 187.
102. l at 187. NRDC points out evidence of environmental disaster related to the
Prudhoe Bay development. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 123-24.
103. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 95.
104. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 889 (D.D.C. 1991).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1988).
106. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 883.
107. Note that NEPA compels a full and fair disclosure of alternatives, but does not
compel the agency's substantive choice. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1988).
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF LEASING AUTHORITY
Once a final 1002 Report and LEIS have been submitted, Congress
can decide to delegate leasing authority to the Secretary; however, leas-
ing and production of oil and gas within ANWR are specifically prohib-
ited until authorized by an act of Congress. 10 8 To the Secretary's
dismay, this authority was denied in the National Energy Security Act of
1992 as a political tradeoff for Congress's declining to impose Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards on the automotive indus-
try.10 9 Environmentalists welcomed this news, although it represented
something less than a victory.
Although the Persian Gulf War created a resurgence of interest in
the need for domestic oil, several factors combined in 1991 to weaken
the pro-development coalition-the dispute between the Department of
the Interior (DOI) and the State of Alaska over royalty shares, 1 10 the
Public Utility Commission controversy and the current political fashion-
ability of environmentalism, to name a few. The issue of ANWR devel-
opment may, however, be reopened when these factors are not present,
and when Congress is able to open the refuge without fear of an effec-
tive public outcry.
If Congress is more sympathetic to ANWR development in the fu-
ture, it is still unclear whether it will favor the Secretary's recommenda-
tion of immediate full leasing or whether it will select one of the more
moderate alternatives considered by the Secretary in the 1002 Re-
port.' 11 One option is to drill a number of test wells, and postpone
further decision pending the results of the drilling.' 1 2 Limited leasing is
another alternative which could minimize the impact of drilling and pro-
duction activity on the Porcupine caribou herd by excluding the herd's
core calving area from exploration and production.
31
3
108. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (1988).
109. Barbara Rosewicz, Energy Measure Clears Congress, Is Sent to Bush, WALL ST.J., Oct. 9,
1992, at A3; Paul Rauber, Last Refuge, SIERRA, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 37.
110. Alaska Governor Stunned by White House Plan, Will Fight for Share of ANWR Oil and Gas
Revenue, 21 ENV'T REP. 1986 (Mar. 8, 1991); see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
111. Discussion of alternative actions is required by ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3142(h)
(1988) and by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). In addition to the development-ori-
ented alternatives discussed below, two non-development options were addressed in the
Impact Statement. One possibility is to designate part or all of ANWR as a national wil-
derness area, which would permanently insulate the refuge from development. The Secre-
tary also rejected this possibility, claiming ANWR's value is not unique due to the amount
of designated wilderness in Alaska and Canada. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 189-
90. Another option, which was the choice temporarily made by Congress in 1992, is to
take no action. The Secretary rejected this approach in the Impact Statement, pointing
out that it could take ten to fifteen years to bring ANWR into production, and claiming
that national security needs make any delays imprudent. Id. at 190.
112. The Secretary rejected the notion of drilling four test wells on the theory that oil
companies require financial incentives to invest in exploration. The Secretary also cited
the political debacle of the federal exploration program in Alaska's National Petroleum
Reserve. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 101, 191. Chevron has drilled an exploratory
well on the ASRC/KIC Native lands in the refuge, but the results have not been made
public. Id.
113. Id. at 191. This alternative would exclude approximately 242,000 acres from pro-
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If Congress eventually grants DOI permission to lease, the Secre-
tary's right to exercise that authority is not automatic. Two barriers to
development will remain: a subsistence analysis and the requirement
that all uses of the refuge must be compatible with its major purpose.1 14
At that point, however, the Secretary will have the advantages of mo-
mentum and investment of resources.
A. Compatible Use Requirement
If Congress extends leasing authority to the Secretary under one of
the above alternatives, a significant obstacle to leasing remains: opening
the coastal plain to full leasing may violate the "compatible use" test
found in ANILCA and the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act
(Refuge Act). 1 5 The Refuge Act authorized the Secretary to "permit
the use of any area within the System for any purpose including, but not
limited to, hunting, fishing, public recreation and accommodations, and
access whenever the Secretary determines that such uses are compatible
with the major purposes for which such areas were established."' " 6
Similarly, ANILCA provides that "the Secretary may not permit any use,
or grant easements for any purpose ... unless such use is compatible
with the purposes of the refuge."
'1 17
The statutory purposes of ANWR are clearly articulated:
(i) To conserve populations and habitats in their natural diver-
sity including, but not limited to, the Porcupine caribou herd
(including participation in coordinated ecological studies and
management of this herd and the Western Arctic caribou herd),
polar bears, grizzly bears, musk oxen, Dall sheep, wolves,
wolverines, snow geese, peregrine falcons and other migratory
birds, and Arctic char and grayling;
(ii) To fulfill the international treaty obligations of the United
States with respect to fish and wildlife and their habitats;
(iii) To provide, in a manner consistent with the purposes set
forth in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), the opportunity for contin-
ued subsistence uses by local residents; and
(iv) To ensure, to the maximum extent practicable and in a
manner consistent with the purposes set forth in paragraph (i),
water quality and necessary water quantity within the refuge." 18
Conspicuously absent from this list is the exploitation of mineral
resources. Although several ANILCA provisions reflect congressional
awareness of the possible existence of oil reserves at the time ANILCA
duction. The Secretary rejected this option, citing estimates that this restriction would
lower the recoverable oil resource by 2576. Id
114. 16 U.S.C. § 3112 (1988); Id. § 668dd(d)(1)(A). An EIS is also required for each
specific lease, Id. § 3149, but these are unlikely to pose obstacles to development.
115. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§ 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980); National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of
1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668e (1988).
116. Refuge Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(A) (1988).
117. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 304(B),
94 Stat. 2371, 2393 (1980).
118. Id. See generally CRS Report, supra note 3.
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was enacted,I 1 9 Congress declined to include the development of these
minerals among the purposes of the refuge. A critical question exists
concerning the meaning of compatibility. Neither the Refuge Act nor
ANILCA supplies a statutory definition. It is possible, however, that a
definition might be borrowed from the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act of 1971.120 According to this statute, "compatibility" means that
the proposed uses must not "materially impair the values for which the
refuge was established."'
12 1
Assuming that compatibility will be defined in terms of material im-
pairment in the context of ANWR, it becomes clear why it is important
to the Secretary to craft a record supporting the notion that develop-
ment in the coastal plain will not harm environmental and subsistence
values. Although arguing that the benefits of development will justify
resulting environmental harms might suffice to win a political victory by
convincing Congress to open the refuge, this argument has no bearing
on the compatible use requirement. Under the arbitrary and capricious
standard for judicial review of agency action, the Secretary simply must
show that development will not violate ANILCA's compatible use re-
quirement by providing some factual basis for arguing that exploration
and development will not materially impair the environmental and sub-
sistence purposes of the refuge. 122 The battle over the adequacy of the
1002 Report/LEIS thus assumes another dimension: in addition to per-
suading Congress to open ANWR to full leasing, the Secretary also is
attempting to provide some basis for his eventual conclusion that devel-
opment is compatible with ANWR's major statutory purposes.
Based on the existing 1002 Report, it is apparent that the Secretary
has not yet indicated that development is compatible with these pur-
poses. For example, the 1002 Report does not show that development
will not materially impair water supply and quality. 12 3 The Secretary
acknowledges in the 1002 Report that 99% of the ANWR environment
is wetlands.' 24 The Secretary, however, never estimates the amount of
water that will be required for or polluted by development. 12 5 Instead,
the Secretary simply states, in a conclusory fashion, that development
will not impair water quality or quantity in the coastal plain, providing
119. E.g., the exploration guidelines, 16 U.S.C. § 3142(d) (1988), and the request that
the Secretary address the impacts of oil and gas development in the Impact Statement. 16
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(d) (1988).
120. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1988).
121. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.4-6(b) (1991). See National Audubon Soc. v. Hodel, 606 F.
Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984), in which the court stated that only activities "compatible"
with the major purposes of a Refuge are permitted under these laws and regulations. Id. at
837. The court held that the Secretary's determination that a support base located within
the refuge in question would be compatible with the environmental protection purposes of
the refuge was contrary to the underlying record. Id. at 846.
122. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§ 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980).
123. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 39-45.
124. IMPAcT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 13.
125. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 41 (estimating the amount of water
needed for an average well and discussing the water pollution associated with oil wells).
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no factual support whatsoever for this statement. 126 Even under the re-
strained scope of inquiry under the arbitrary and capricious standard of
judicial review, it is unlikely that a mere conclusory statement will consti-
tute a showing that ANILCA's purpose of water protection will not be
materially impaired.
Notwithstanding claims that the current 1002 Report underesti-
mates the environmental impacts of development, it can be argued that
the existing 1002 Report positively demonstrates that development is
not compatible with the purposes of the refuge. The Secretary's analysis
of impacts on the Porcupine caribou herd and on subsistence provides
an illustration. The Secretary acknowledges that successful oil develop-
ment and production will have significant and long-lasting impacts.'
2 7
These include major effects on the area's limited natural fresh-water
sources, noise generation from aircraft and drilling operations and im-
paired visual appearance caused by drilling and production opera-
tions. 128 Mining gravel for use in operations may cause melting of
permafrost, destruction of tundra, erosion and stream pollution.' 2 9 Ac-
cidental spills of crude oil and refined petroleum products, an "inevita-
ble consequence" of oil field- development, 130 are expected to occur in
the coastal plain, with possible severe decreases in vegetation as a result.
Likewise, the 1002 Report acknowledges that this disruption of the
coastal plain habitat will produce "major effects" on the Porcupine cari-
bou herd.' 13  The Report defines "major effects" as "widespread, long-
term change in habitat availability or quality [that] would likely modify
natural abundance or distribution of species."1 3 2 Although the Report
denies that an appreciable population decline is anticipated,' 3 3 it
predicts that a change in the herd's distribution is to be expected.13 4
126. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 198; Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at
43.
127. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 115. The Secretary claims that unsuccessful
exploration will produce only short-term, minor impacts on the coastal plain. Id.
128. Id. at 113-14. Since 99% of the coastal plain is wetlands, dedicating the vast
amounts of water required for oil and gas development activities to industrial uses will
have a major effect. Noise generated by aircraft operations, drilling operations and traffic
at work sites would be major. The visual effects of such activities would be a major, long-
term consequence of full leasing as well. Id
129. "Moderate effects" would be caused by removing gravel from natural sites to con-
struction areas, resulting in changes to topography in these areas. Localized removal or
destruction of tundra vegetation would result from constructing gravel drilling and equip-
ment pads, gravel roads and gravel mines. Thermokarsting (caused by melting of ground
ice and settling or caving of the ground surface so that pits, depressions and small ponds
result) of tundra is expected. Permafrost may melt under burrow sites and under vegeta-
tion disturbed by other development activities, resulting in sloughing, erosion and stream
pollution lasting well beyond the life of the project. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at
111-13.
130. Id. at 115. Throughout the operation of Prudhoe Bay, there have been very large
spills of over 10,000 gallons of crude oil, gasoline and diesel fuel. Id.
131. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 123.
132. Id. at 107.
133. This contention is hotly contested by NRDC, which argues that new information
regarding the caribou affected by activity in the Prudhoe Bay area calls this conclusion into
serious doubt. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 41, at 124.
134. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 124.
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Any significant change in the migration pattern, redistribution or popu-
lation of the Porcupine herd could be expected to have significant ad-
verse impacts on the subsistence lifestyle of the Gwich'in Indians of
Arctic Village, who annually harvest caribou for subsistence uses.13 5
These changes also may affect the United States's compliance with inter-
national treaties concerning the caribou.'
36
Thus, based on the existing 1002 Report alone, it can be argued
that development will significantly impair three of the major purposes of
the refuge-protection of the Porcupine herd, subsistence use and com-
pliance with international treaties-and therefore fails the compatible
use test.
B. Section 810 Analysis
An independent barrier to oil and gas development in ANWR's
coastal plain is found in Title VIII of ANILCA, which protects subsis-
tence uses of public lands in Alaska by requiring that other uses of the
lands have the least possible adverse impact on subsistence.' 3 7 Section
810(a) of ANILCA requires that whenever a federal agency proposes to
"withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise permit the use, occupancy, or
disposition of [Alaskan] public lands," the head of that agency must first
evaluate the effect of the proposed use and identify alternatives that
would reduce or eliminate the proposed use of the public lands needed
for subsistence.13 8 If this evaluation indicates that the proposed use
would significantly restrict subsistence uses, the Secretary must provide
notice to appropriate state and local agencies and hold local hearings in
the areas to be affected. 139 Before the use can be carried out, the
agency must determine that a significant restriction of subsistence uses
is necessary, that a minimal amount of public lands will be used and that
reasonable steps are taken to minimize adverse impacts upon subsis-
tence uses.' 40 If an EIS is required for leasing, it must include these
subsistence findings.
14 1
The section 810 analysis is part of ANILCA's strong policy prefer-
ence in favor of subsistence. Protection of subsistence lifestyles is iden-
tified as one of the primary purposes of ANILCA.14 2 Section 802 states:
135. Id. at 40.
136. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 66.
137. 16 U.S.C. § 3112 (1988).
138. Id § 3120.
139. Id. §§ 3120(a), (a)(1), (a)(2).
140. Id. § 3120. The pertinent language reads:
In determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise permit the use,
occupancy, or disposition of public lands under any provision of law authorizing
such actions, the head of the Federal agency, having primary jurisdiction over
such lands or his designee shall evaluate the effect of such use, occupancy, or
disposition on subsistence uses and needs, the availability of other lands for the
purposes sought to be achieved, and other alternatives which would reduce or
eliminate the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands needed for subsis-
tence purposes.
Id.
141. Id. §§ 3120(b) (1988); NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 883 (D.D.C. 1991).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (1988).
[Vol. 70:1
AMERICA'S LAST GREAT WILDERNESS
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress that-(1) con-
sistent with sound management principles, and the conserva-
tion of healthy populations of fish and wildlife, the utilization of
the public lands in Alaska is to cause the least adverse impact
possible on rural residents who depend upon subsistence uses
of the resources of such lands; consistent with management of
fish and wildlife in accordance with recognized scientific princi-
ples and the purposes for each unit established, designated, or
expanded by or pursuant to titles II through VII of the Act, the
purpose of this subchapter is to provide the opportunity for
rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to do so. 143
This preference is based on a congressional recognition that "the con-
tinuation of the opportunity for subsistence uses by rural residents of
Alaska... is essential to Native physical, economic, traditional, and cul-
tural existence and to non-Native physical, economic, traditional, and
social existence."'
44
Despite the strong enunciation of a policy in favor of protecting
subsistence, in reality, section 810 offers only weak protection against oil
and gas development which threatens the subsistence of the Gwich'in.
First, the subsistence analysis will not be conducted until after Congress
has made its initial decision whether to grant leasing authority to the
Secretary. Section 810 states that the subsistence evaluation is required
"[i]n determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise per-
mit the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands under any provi-
sion of law authorizing such actions .... ,, 14 5 In NRDC v. Lujan,146 the
D.C. District Court found that NRDC's claim based on the 1002 Report/
LEIS's failure to include the section 810 subsistence evaluation was pre-
mature because leasing authority has not yet been authorized by
Congress. 147
This holding considerably weakens the role that subsistence issues
will play in the congressional deliberation of extending leasing author-
ity. Although effects of development on subsistence are addressed in
the baseline study of the coastal plain, alternatives that would minimize
these impacts are not discussed. 148 Thus, without an adequate discus-
sion of alternative development strategies that could reduce impacts on
subsistence, Congress must decide whether to permit leasing as well as
restrictions to impose on this authority. Once congressional leasing au-
thority has been granted, it may be too late for the subsistence analysis
to play a decisive role. At that point, political momentum will likely
render Congress less willing to subsequently revoke or limit the Sec-
143. Id. § 3112. Arguably, section 802 is part of a subchapter largely oriented toward
protecting subsistence resources from taking by non-subsistence uses such as hunting and
fishing, for example, section 804 speaks in terms of restricting other consumptive uses
when necessary to ensure adequate subsistence resources. Id. § 3114. However, the pol-
icy statement favoring subsistence is not restricted to consumptive uses. Id. § 3112(2).
144. Id. § 3111(1).
145. Id. § 3120.
146. 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1991).
147. Id. at 884.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(E) (1988).
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retary's leasing authority based on the results of the subsistence
evaluation.
Similarly, if substantial investments are made by developers based
on congressional approval of leasing, a reviewing court will be reluctant
to enjoin development activities based on section 810. For instance, in
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell,149 the Supreme Court reversed
an injunction against offshore exploration activities based on the Secre-
tary's failure to conduct a section 810(a) subsistence analysis, citing the
fact that oil developers had already made considerable investment in ex-
ploratory activities, which would be lost if exploration was enjoined.' 5 0
It is questionable whether a challenge under section 810 could re-
sult in a prohibition of development activities in the refuge. Unlike the
compatible use requirement, section 810 does not compel the Secretary
to forego development that would interfere with subsistence uses; it
merely requires the Secretary to evaluate the effects of development in
order to decide whether significant restrictions on subsistence are to be
expected. Depending on the Secretary's success in the forum of the
1002 Report, he may be able to provide himself with an arguable basis
for finding no significant restrictions on subsistence. Even if the Secre-
tary does find significant restriction of subsistence and elects to conduct
hearings, section 810 probably does not pose a serious barrier to devel-
opment. The Secretary must find that such a significant restriction is
"necessary," but presumably, the proposed authorized use justifies re-
strictions of subsistence under section 810.151 Second, although the
Secretary must ensure that the restriction will involve a minimal amount
of public lands and that the impacts will be minimized, 15 2 it does not
provide that the proposed use will be prohibited if the Secretary finds
that restrictions on subsistence uses cannot be minimized.'
53
C. Lease-by-Lease Analysis
The Secretary must determine on a lease-by-lease basis whether
each lease is consistent with the major purposes of the refuge.
154 If
NEPA is applicable, he must prepare an EIS for each leasing decision,
including the section 810 subsistence evaluation. 55 Presumably, these
subsequent leasing decisions would be subject to challenge under the
arbitrary and capricious standard because in each case, the Secretary
must state his reasons for the decision and explain why the reasons for
leasing would be compatible or incompatible with the purposes of the
149. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
150. Id. at 544.
151. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1988).
152. Id. § 3120(a)(3).
153. See supra notes 115-36. However, a finding of significant adverse effects in the
subsistence evaluation may be used to show that the proposed development is not compat-
ible with the major purposes of the refuge. Id.
154. 16 U.S.C. § 3149(b) (1988).
155. Id.
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refuge.1 56 But again, the Secretary could cite the 1002 Report in his
own support when defending any challenged leasing decision, which les-
sens the chance that a court would find his actions arbitrary and
capricious.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
A. Recent Legislative Developments
ANWR has been the subject of passionate debate in the halls of
Congress during the last few years. 157 The Bush Administration, the
Department of the Interior, the State of Alaska and big oil companies
have attempted to convince Congress that ANWR should be opened for
drilling activity. 15 8 The Johnston-Wallop energy bill, which contained
such a provision, was prevented from reaching the floor of the Senate by
a filibuster on November 1, 1991; this effectively killed the bill. 159 The
filibuster was made up of a coalition of senators representing very di-
verse interests--environmentalists, public utility companies and auto-
mobile manufacturers-who compromised on controversial issues in
order to defeat the bill.' 60 The automobile manufacturers worked with
the environmentalists to further their own agenda and ensure that the
CAFE standards, a provision placed in the bill to mandate higher auto-
mobile efficiency, would be killed.' 6 1 The National Energy Security Act
(NESA), presently winding its way through the halls of Congress, no
longer poses an immediate danger to ANWR because its sponsors real-
ize that adding a provision for drilling in ANWR would be the Act's
death warrant.1 62 In an attempt to emphasize his views on the subject,
President Bush has threatened to veto the NESA if it does not provide
for the commencement of drilling in ANWR or, alternatively, threatened
to attach a similar provision to another bill which might make it more
difficult for environmentalists to line up allies.
16 3
B. Wilderness Area Designation
The National Energy Security Act of 1991 represents a victory for
ANWR defenders, but only a temporary one. Given our nation's reluc-
tance to wean itself from oil dependence, the current faltering domestic
economy and the oil industry's political staying power, it is unlikely that
pressure to develop ANWR's reserves will cease. The only alternative to
keeping ANWR constantly on the national agenda is to provide stronger
legislative barriers to mineral development.
156. Id.
157. See generally CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE:
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION SINCE THE 99TH CONGRESS (Apr. 5, 1991).




162. Supra note 53.
163. OIL & GAS J., supra note 158, at 17.
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One way to secure more permanent protection is to upgrade
ANWR's status from national wildlife refuge to national wilderness area.
Generally, commercial enterprise and permanent roads are prohibited
in these areas.1 64 Temporary roads, mechanical transport and aircraft
landings are prohibited as well, except as necessary to administer the
area for the purposes of the Act-which do not include mineral develop-
ment.165 The extent of protection may depend on how the coastal plain
is added to the national wilderness preservation system. If the plain is
designated a national forest, data-gathering to determine mineral values
will be not only permitted, but required.1 6 6 Designation as a national
wildlife area, however, will preclude oil and gas exploration or
development.
Redesignation may not immunize ANWR from development per-
manently, but it will mean that greater pro-development momentum
would be needed to revoke wilderness designation. If the coastal plain
is characterized as national forest and thus made subject to mineral ex-
ploration, and such exploration confirms the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment's enthusiastic predictions about the quantity of oil reserves,
publication of these data could fuel developers' efforts to revoke the wil-
derness area designation. Nevertheless, commercial mineral develop-
ment will not be permissible as long as the plain remains in the system.
ANILCA requires the Secretary of the Interior to consider whether
ANWR is suitable for wilderness preservation.1 67 The Secretary re-
jected this option in the 1002 Report, arguing that he was persuaded
that wilderness "designation is not necessary to protect the 1002 area
environment and is not in the best interest of the Nation."'
68
Opponents of redesignation may argue that ANWR's coastal plain
does not meet the threshold requirements for national wilderness area
status. No serious allegation can be made that the coastal plain does not
fulfill the Act's definition of wilderness as "an area where the earth and
its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a
visitor who does not remain." 169 However, opponents may protest that
adding ANWR's coastal plain to the wilderness preservation system is
164. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1988).
165. Id. § 1131 (1988).
166. Id. § 1133(d)(2). However, these activities must be carried out in a manner con-
sistent with the preservation of the wilderness environment. Id.
167. Id. § 3144. The largest part of ANWR is already designated as a wilderness area.
The only part of the refuge which is still open to question regarding wilderness designa-
tion is the coastal plain area or the 1002 area. CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at ix-x.
168. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 189-90.
169. 16 U.S.C. § 113 1(c) (1988). The definition further states that wilderness is "an
area of underdeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, with-
out permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as
to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnotice-
able; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of
recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make
practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain
ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical
value." Id.
[Vol. 70:1
AMERICA'S LAST GREAT WILDERNESS
inconsistent with the purposes of the National Wilderness Preservation
System Act. Since a great deal of Alaskan territory is already protected
by various wilderness designations, it might be argued that the Act's
purposes of preserving some land in pristine condition have already
been fulfilled by existing wilderness in Alaska and that the ANWR
coastal plain designation is thus superfluous. In addition, some critics
have suggested that, notwithstanding the area's biological value, the
plain lacks the spectacular vistas that should inspire the most stringent
protection.
These attacks on ANWR's suitability as a national wilderness area
bear very little weight. First of all, the Act does not quantify how much
wilderness is needed to adequately protect the public interest in pre-
served lands. Second, the argument that enough wilderness has been
preserved in Alaska is ludicrous since ANWR is widely recognized as the
last pristine wilderness remaining in the United States, and thus it is
precisely the type of land the Act seeks to protect. Finally, the area's
recreational value in terms of spectacular scenery is irrelevant; the pur-
pose of wilderness area protection is not to safeguard areas with particu-
lar unique characteristics, but to provide the public with unaltered
wilderness areas.
170
Upgrading ANWR's designation has attracted some congressional
support. On October 17, 1991, a twelve to four majority of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee approved legislation pro-
posed by Senator William Roth (R-Del.) adding the coastal plain to the
National Wilderness Preservation System, 17 1 but the bill has not been
voted on by the entire Senate. Proponents of the bill optimistically pre-
dict strong support from the same legislators who voted to exclude the
authorization to lease ANWR from the 1991 National Energy Security
Act. However, any measure providing permanent sanctity for the area,
as opposed to a temporary reprieve, is likely to face far stronger opposi-
tion. Under the current administration, such a measure would almost
certainly be vetoed. Thus, although redesignation as a national wilder-
ness area is an extremely potent defensive weapon, it may be an issue
better reserved for a different administration. Alternatively, the specter
of a vigorous redesignation campaign might be used to gain leverage in
negotiating for other protection measures.
In creating ANWR, Congress resolved to protect the last and great-
est wilderness in North America. Unfortunately, the statutory scheme,
which was designed to ensure that development will not be conducted at
the expense of the environmental and subsistence values, is dependent
on the production of a "factual finding" that is essentially under the full
control of the Secretary of the Interior. Taking full advantage of the
wide berth given agency discretion under the arbitrary and capricious
standard ofjudicial review, the Secretary can custom-build a factual rec-
170. McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965).
171. S. 39, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); Senators Pledge Filibuster on Energy Bill to Block
Arctic Refuge Drilling Provisions, 22 ENV'T REP. 1618 (Oct. 25, 1991).
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ord to support his foregone conclusion in favor of development, thus
frustrating the requirement that uses of the refuge must be compatible
with the major purposes for which it was designed. If neither Congress
nor the courts intercede, the Secretary of the Interior can pillage the last
true wilderness and destroy the foundation of the last subsistence econ-
omy in the United States.
The only permanent protection for ANWR's coastal plain is legisla-
tive. To settle the question permanently, Congress should redesignate
ANWR as statutory wilderness.
